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ABSTRACT 
One way to educate United States Army Special Operators is by allowing 
organizational design and individual competencies to form the nucleus of a professional 
military education curriculum routinely evaluated against assessment variables such as 
the emerging strategic context, the requests of Theater Special Operations Commands or 
other customer units, and the feedback of deployed operators and teams. This thesis 
recommends an Army Special Operations Command-focused educational development 
process applicable to the career-long education and utilization of Special Forces, Civil 
Affairs, and Psychological Operations professionals. To make these recommendations, 
the thesis considers why the organizational structure of the Army Special Operations 
Forces (ARSOF) should differ from that of their General Purpose Forces counterparts and 
identifies the expected ARSOF mission set for the next twenty years as well as the 
professional competencies required to execute this expected mission set. It then offers a 
series of suggestions for how the recommended changes could be implemented.  
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I.  PREFACE 
The least well-known professionals employed by the United States Army are the 
men and women who form the inimitable cadre of warriors and academicians who spend 
their days thinking about professional military education (PME) for the United States 
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). This thesis draws on much of their work in 
an attempt to foment professional debate about the future of ARSOF as an adaptable 
learning institution. Unlike the majority of academic thought papers that analyze and 
present data in a dry and mechanistic fashion, this thesis presents several ideas for 
consideration utilizing the literary medium of fiction. The characters used to convey the 
ideas herein are figments of the author’s imagination. However, their duty positions are 
existent and, in the real world, are filled by dedicated United States Army officers and 
non-commissioned officers; any relationship to any actual former or future special 
operator is purely unintentional.  
What you take away from the following pages will depend on your desire to infer 
practical concepts from the nascent thoughts presented to you by members of the United 
States Army Special Operations Command PME working group that, while it does not 
exist in reality, you will nonetheless find hard at work in the pages to follow.  
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II. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR UNITED 
STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (ARSOF) 
The principal goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing 
new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done. 
Jean Piaget (1896–1980) Swiss cognitive psychologist 
 
CG: Hey DCO, you’re never going to believe this; come in here and shut the 
door.  
DCO: What’s going on sir?  
CG: The General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) are both on the same page at the same time. Look at these documents: 
We find compelling evidence that the U.S. Army’s officer Corps will be 
unequal to future demands unless substantive management changes are 
made. Perhaps the most obvious risk indicator is the Army’s persistent and 
substantial gap in mid-career officers.1 
Ok, so that’s what the Strategic Studies Institute is putting out. Now, take a look 
at this excerpt from the 2010 SOCOM strategy that was just published: 
The Operator is the platform upon which all other systems must orient . . . 
This operator is the building block and foundation of teams and units 
encompassing USSOF specialists including intelligence, logistics, and 
communications, as well as other essential functions. . . . In order to 
realize the vision, the right collection of operational, technical, and 
intellectual capabilities, capacities, and authorities are essential to enable 
the Operator to execute potential mission sets across the core activities.2 
What’s your take DCO?  
                                                 
1 Wardynski et al., Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human 
Capital Model Focused upon Talent (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 
v. 
2 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010 
(Tampa, 2009), 1. 
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DCO: Sir, I think we are going to see professional military education (PME) 
become the hot topic for the next few years. I also think that this is something we should 
weigh in on early so we can shape the Army’s point of view because the GPF provide a 
large portion of the PME ARSOF officers receive.  
CG: Why don’t you form a small working group to conduct a literature survey, 
see what the prevailing thoughts on ARSOF PME currently are, and send me your 
findings? Your primary task is to determine if our way of doing business requires any 
change in order to better resource our people. I am very interested to see if we need to 
make any changes to the way our people are educated and, if so, what changes you 
recommend. I want you to consider the capacity of our people to operate effectively 
across the entire spectrum of conflict, from conducting direct action missions through 
supporting humanitarian operations, to performing support and stability operations in 
conjunction with non-military and non-governmental organizations. I am not convinced 
that it is humanly possible for us to develop and manage a pool of ARSOF talent that can 
adequately execute our entire mission set all the time. That said, make sure you look at 
our current core missions and see if they will still be relevant as ARSOF missions in the 
future. I also want you to look at the educational competencies required by the ARSOF 
mission set and see what you think about creating specialists versus generalists within 
ARSOF. Review the ARSOF training and development model and see if it needs 
amending to better educate our people to get the job done. 
In fact, I have a list of specific questions that I’d like your group to address. The 
overarching question is: how should we enhance ARSOF professional education to 
ensure our units can successfully execute the missions of the next 20 years? The three 
underlying questions that get at the heart of this big question are: 
1.  Why should the organizational structure of the ARSOF community differ 
from that of the GPF? 
2.  To execute our expected mission set, what type of professional 
competencies does the ARSOF community need? 
3.  How could we structure an ARSOF education system to provide our 
professionals with the competencies that you identify?  
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I also want you to limit the size and scope of your working group. I do not see any 
need to involve anyone outside this headquarters; the people in our subordinate units 
certainly have their plates full with current operations. My final request is that I want you 
to scale your research in a particular way. I want you to focus on Special Forces, 
Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs folks. I do not want you to focus your 
attention on the Rangers or the 160th pilots; the regimental commanders are working a 
separate plan for me regarding their people. Touch base with me before you head out for 
the day and propose whom you think should be in the working group.  
DCO: Roger sir, I got it. 
 
 To: CG, USASOC 
 From: DCO, USASOC 
 Subject: PME Working Group 
  
Sir, 
These people will comprise the PME working group we discussed earlier today: 
 
ARSOF Duty Position Rank Bona Fides 
Deputy Intelligence Officer  
Intel 
LTC  4 yrs MI basic branch 
11 yrs SF experience 
Aide de Camp 
ADC 
MAJ 4 yrs FA basic branch 
9 yrs SF experience 
Clinical Psychologist 
Doc 
MAJ 8 yrs enlisted CA experience 
Operations Sergeant 
Ops 
SFC 14 yrs SF experience 
  
We will conduct our initial research, show you our data, and recommend ways 







 To: DCO, USASOC 
 From: CG, USASOC 
 Subject: RE: PME Working Group 
 
 Looks good DCO, execute! 
  
 CG 
A. ARSOF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
ADC: Let’s begin our research by comparing the organizational designs and 
cultures of ARSOF and GPF. I think organizational design is one of the most important, 
yet underutilized analytical tools in the Army and I agree with LTG(R) Dubik who says:  
Even the best people will be constrained—perhaps driven out—by poor 
organizational  structures and cultures. We all live and operate within an 
organizational context. An organization’s climate affects the contributions 
of individuals and the achievement of the common mission.3 
INTEL: How will organizational design help us prove that our guys should be 
different from GPF guys? From my perspective, we are organized just like the GPF: they 
have companies, we have companies; they have regiments, we have groups. Isn’t that 
about as different as it gets?  
ADC: No sir, I don’t think it is that simple. It is true that our organizational 
nomenclature and infrastructure are similar, but “a great many problems in organizational 
design stem from the assumption that organizations are all alike: mere collections of 
component parts to which elements of structure can be added and deleted at will, a sort of 
organizational bazaar.”4 What makes us different is the fact that ARSOF is an 
organization comprised of adhocracies while the GPF much more closely resemble 
professional bureaucracies. 
                                                 




4 Henry Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review (1981): 2. 
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DOC: OK, you gentlemen are going to have to work with me for a bit. Help me 
understand the difference between professional bureaucracies and adhocracies before we 
get into a discussion of how they apply to Army units and soldiers. 
ADC: Not a problem Doc, my last company commander graduated from the 
Naval Postgraduate School and structured a company professional development program 
around the things he learned out there. I saved the design slide he gave us and I just 
pulled it up on my Blackberry. You guys pass it around and take a look. While you are 
reading the slide, please keep in mind that the distinctions between the two organizational 
structures, the naming conventions, and the definitions are not mine, and that the slide is 
a conglomeration of ideas taken from world-renowned organizational theorist Dr. Henry 
Mintzberg.5  
 
                                                 
5 The Mintzberg ideas, drawn from his Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit? and seminar notes 
taken during Dr. Erik Jansen’s Spring 2009 Naval Postgraduate School class titled “Organizational Design 
for Special Operations,” are presented here to provide a basic understanding of the differences between 
professional bureaucracies and adhocracies. The distinctions are not comprehensive; however, they provide 






Figure 1.   Organizational Design 
DOC: Got it. 
ADC: OK, I see why ARSOF units need to be adhocracies; because we generally 
deploy as relatively small teams, we do a good job reacting swiftly to change and 
adapting well to changing environments. What really constrains GPF from reacting and 
adapting in the same manner is not a lack of any specific ability, it is a function of their 
organization. The real value of ARSOF’s organization as an adhocracy is that the sum of 
the parts is greater than the whole, which is directly attributable to our ability to organize 
operational teams according to anticipated mission requirements. The major difference 
between GPF and us is that SF, CA, and PSYOP teams have flexible organizational 




everyone else. Ambiguity abounds, giving rise to all sorts of conflicts and political 
pressures. Adhocracy can do no ordinary thing well. But it is extraordinary at 
innovation.”6  
I think one of the strengths of the ARSOF community requiring revitalization in 
accordance with our original charter is our innovative style of conducting non-standard 
missions without detracting from the GPF’s ability to continue honing their core 
competencies. The delineation between GPF and ARSOF is not “either-or,” it is “yes, 
and.” Both organizations have specialty areas and, in some cases, our areas will overlap 
either by design or by necessity. The key to determining why our organizational structure 
should differ from the GPF is to remember why we were created and to determine what 
our history means for our future.  
INTEL: I think I can help with the ARSOF background data that we will need to 
frame our discussion. I had to write an information paper about ARSOF history last year 
at Fort Leavenworth and present it to my small group. Why don’t we break for lunch and 
you guys can read it and tell me if it is relevant at 1300.  
The history of Army Special Operations Forces is rooted in the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS). World War II OSS veterans Colonels Aaron Bank and Russell 
Volckmann were the vanguard that brought ARSOF into existence and their reason for 
establishing ARSOF elements is generally described this way: 
Special operations, as envisioned by the two men, and by Bank in 
particular, were a force multiplier: a small number of soldiers who could 
sow a disproportionately large amount of trouble for the enemy. 
Confusion would reign among enemy ranks and objectives would be 
accomplished with an extreme economy of manpower.7  
Bank and Volkmann received a helping hand from Secretary of the Army Frank 
Pace who, in 1951, pressured the Army General Council to create the Office of the Chief 
                                                 
6 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 12.  
7 Global Security, “Early Cold War Army Special Operations,” Global Security: Military, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arsoc-history3.htm.  
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of Psychological Warfare (OCPW).8 As the first leader of OCPW, Brigadier General 
Robert McClure recruited WWII veterans with considerable experience in guerrilla 
warfare and with operating behind enemy lines. McClure saw the need for a force 
capable of conducting special operations, and he accepted the view of OCPW’s Special 
Operations Division Chief, Colonel Volkmann, that such missions should include: 
1.  Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare 
2.  Sabotage and subversion 
3.  Evasion and escape 
4.  Ranger and Commando-like operations 
5.  Long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance 
6.  Psychological warfare9  
Under the Congressional provisions of the Lodge Bill, McClure formed an OSS-
like special unit comprised mainly of immigrants from Eastern Europe who were capable 
of training guerrilla armies in Soviet occupied areas, as well as conducting other 
unconventional operations deep inside enemy territory. Special Operation Forces 
morphed from their OSS roots into the modern form during America’s involvement in 
Southeast Asia. 
“With Operation White Star in Laos and the increasing requirements associated 
with the advisory mission in Vietnam, the need for ARSOF grew. By 1969, there were 
almost thirteen thousand men in seven Special Forces groups.”10 In the aftermath of the 
failed Iranian Hostage Rescue mission (1979) and the lessons learned from Operation 
Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983), Congress fought for and won an increased capability for 
all military special operations in general, and ARSOF in particular. On December 1, 
1989, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) took control of  
 
                                                 
8 For detailed information regarding Secretary of the Army Frank Pace’s impact on the creation of the 
OCPW, refer to Alfred H. Paddock Jr., “The Road to Fort Bragg,” in U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its 
Origins (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002). 
9 Alfred H. Paddock Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2002). 
10 Dick Couch, Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior (New York: Crown 
Publishing Group, 2007), 277. 
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all ARSOF forces. Throughout their existence, ARSOF units have been organizations 
filled with professionals capable of operating independently or as small teams in order to 
conduct non-standard missions in complex environments. 
DOC: Ok, I went over the history paper during lunch and I think I have a grasp of 
the organizational design requirements essential for ARSOF professionals. Let me give 
you my conclusions and you tell me if I understand the picture of ARSOF you are 
painting. First, because ARSOF teams conduct non-standard missions, they must 
maintain a tremendous amount of organizational flexibility such that the control 
mechanisms in one team may be completely unlike those in another team. Second, 
informal communication, both internal and external to the teams, is required to ensure 
mission accomplishment because teams that share organizational office space in garrison 
may conduct operations in completely different geographical and cultural areas when 
deployed. Finally, ARSOF teams routinely accomplish missions beyond the scope of 
many GPF elements due to their small size, unique skill set, and flexible operational 
acumen.  
ADC: Doc, I think your conclusions along with the following statement regarding 
ARSOF organizational culture present an excellent justification for ARSOF elements 
being organized the way they are.  
The history of U.S. special operations forces is in many ways separate 
from that of American conventional military forces and has resulted in an 
organizational culture—values, beliefs, and perspective—distinct within 
the American military. Special operators fight a different kind of war. A 
war that often involves more training of other forces than fighting. A war 
that frequently requires observation rather than attack. A war that pits a 
handful of special operators against large conventional forces. A war that 
is most likely to take place during peacetime, before and after military 
conflict, in an attempt to prevent crises or put things back together if war 
is unavoidable. Special operators know their history and see its effect on 
who they are today.11 
                                                 
11 Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997), 264. 
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INTEL: Following the assertion that ARSOF fights a different kind of war to its 
logical conclusion, retired Major General Sidney Shachnow, a 32-year veteran of the 
Special Forces provides an excellent description of the type of professionals required to 
conduct ARSOF missions. Recalling his conversation with Shachnow, author Robert D. 
Kaplan writes: 
A Special Forces guy, Shachnow told me, has to be a lethal killer one 
moment and a humanitarian the next. He has to know how to get strangers 
who speak another language to do things for him. He has to go from 
knowing enough Russian to knowing enough Arabic in just a few weeks, 
depending on the deployment. We need people who are cultural quick 
studies. Shachnow was talking about a knack for dealing with people, 
almost a form of charisma. The right man will know how to behave in a 
given situation—will know how to find things out and act on them.12  
Although Shachnow limited his comments to members of one component of the 
total ARSOF organization, I think we all agree that the same requirements are generally 
true of PSYOP and CA professionals. 
OPS: Now that we have reviewed the type of organization that ARSOF is and 
where it came from, we need to spend some time explaining why ARSOF professionals 
should maintain these historical differences in support of whatever our country’s future 
missions turn out to be.  
INTEL: Interestingly enough, I recently completed a review of the United States 
Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 and the 
Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) article The Army of the 21st Century and I think these 
two documents provide a good discussion of the possible future operating contexts. I 
think we should rely heavily on the JOE and refrain from using ARSOF or SOCOM 
analysis so that we can avoid giving the CG assessments and recommendations open to 
criticism as ARSOF-centric, one-sided, or too narrow in scope. 
ADC: Sir, I think that’s wise. While you have the floor, I’d appreciate it if you 
would go ahead and frame the potential future operating environment for us. 
                                                 
12 Robert D. Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth,” The Atlantic Monthly (2003): 65. 
 13
INTEL: The part of the JOE that I found most interesting was the opening 
statement regarding the context of international interaction for the next twenty years. The 
JFCOM analysis is significantly different from most prognostications we see from 
Washington-based think tanks; JFCOM’s analysis is that “despite serious challenges to 
international stability by unconventional powers using a variety of tools and methods, 
cooperation and competition among conventional powers will continue to be a primary 
operational context for the Joint Force for the next 25 years.”13 
Even though intelligence analysis and prediction is certainly not a zero sum game, 
I think the JFCOM framing is important because it points to the fact that state-on-state 
warfare is a concept that is going to dominate international relations well into the future. 
Our military in general, and the land forces of the GPF in particular, must maintain the 
capability to win large-scale battles with overwhelming force. Understanding that the 
Army is America’s primary land-based fighting force, I don’t think the CSA’s assessment 
of the future operating environment puts as much emphasis as it should on maintaining a 
GPF force-on-force capability. I think the Army is pushing too hard to turn itself into an 
organization configured to conduct unconventional operations. The CSA seemed intent 
on tilting the focus of the GPF too far out of balance toward unconventional operations 
when he wrote: 
Given the emerging security environment, the evolving character of 
conflict, and the Secretary of Defense’s vision of balance in our defense 
strategy, we see four  roles for land forces in the 21st century: prevail in 
protracted counterinsurgency  campaigns; engage to help other nations 
build capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civil authorities at 
home and abroad; deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state 
actors.14  
I think it is probably wise for the Army to increase its ability to conduct what it 
terms “hybrid” or “irregular” warfare; I just don’t think it should do this at the expense of 
its conventional capability, which increasingly appears to be what the Army is doing. Too 
great a focus by the GPF on changing its organizational structure or its leader 
                                                 
13 United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (Suffolk, 2009), 38. 
14 General George W. Casey Jr., “The Army of the 21st Century,” Army Magazine (October 2009): 26. 
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professional development program will create a situation in which we have a large GPF 
with a greatly degraded capacity to conduct conventional warfare. Further, transitioning a 
professional bureaucracy into an organization comprised of professionals capable of 
conducting effective irregular operations across all three levels of war would be a 
monumental undertaking requiring decades to complete.  
Speaking of irregular warfare, in addition to the discussion of major state-on-state 
war, the JOE posits what I think is a crucial warning: 
The second scenario of particular significance confronting the Joint Force 
is the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are 
in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to 
prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now 
and the 2030s. The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and 
nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the 
background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War.15 
In his discussion of the future operating environment, the CSA basically says that 
the structure of the GPF, as well as the traditional abilities of GPF professionals, requires 
an almost total restructuring. The following is General Casey in his own words. 
The future is not simply irregular warfare by nonstate actors—adversaries 
can be expected to use a full spectrum of options, including every 
political, economic, informational and military measure at their disposal. 
When combined with cultural and demographic factors, these measures 
will present U.S. military leaders with complex challenges that will 
require increasingly complex solutions. Hybrid threats necessitate hybrid 
solutions, and such solutions increasingly require military forces that are 
adaptive and versatile  enough to function in a variety of situations against 
myriad threats with a diverse set of national, allied and indigenous 
partners.16  
What I am trying to point out with this comparison between the CSA’s vision of 
the future and JFCOM’s analysis is that our future operating environment will be more 
complex than ever before in the history of our country.  
                                                 
15 United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment, 62.  
16 Casey, Army Magazine, 28. 
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I am fully aware that neither the analysis I read you nor my commentary is 
groundbreaking, but where I am going with this line of discussion is to an assessment of 
what JFCOM and the GPF see as the type of professional required to conduct operations 
in our future operating context.  
Published in November 2009, A Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) for a 21st 
Century Army, is the CSA-approved guidance for leader development. “The ALDS builds 
on an accrual of skills, at each level and over time, to prepare leaders for increased 
responsibility. It is important to note that any development model we pursue must be 
built on a foundation of lethality [sic] as the unique capability we deliver to the 
nation.”17 When compared to the CSA’s written statement from a month prior, this 
statement seems to place too great an emphasis on kinetic operations: “being versatile, 
expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable and interoperable are the defining qualities of a 
balanced Army.”18 The ALDS also appears mechanistic and too highly standardized 
when it delineates the Army’s professional expectations by virtue of rank.  
For instance, here is a summary of the GPF’s expected proficiencies by leader 
grouping:  
Our junior leaders must achieve and sustain mastery of mission essential 
weapons, equipment and systems. We want our junior level leaders to 
anticipate transitions within tactical operations and act upon opportunities. 
We want them to appreciate the complexity of the security environment in 
which they operate and have sufficient knowledge of geo-politics, culture, 
language, and information operations to recognize the need to consult 
experts. 
Mid-grade leaders will possess self-awareness skills in order to come to 
grips with the reality that their subordinates possess individual 
proficiencies that exceed their own. We expect them to become masters of 
military science; those who display an inclination will become apprentices  
 
 
                                                 
17 United States Department of the Army, “A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army,” 
Department of the Army, 
https://atn.army.mil/media/docs/A%20Leader%20Development%20Strategy%20for%20an%20Expeditiona
ry%20Army%2011%20SEP%2009%20(Approved).pdf  
18 Casey, Army Magazine, 34. 
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in operational art. . . . It is at this level that leaders begin to understand 
how their formations enable the work of the multitude of civilian 
organizations they will encounter outside the joint and coalition formation.  
Senior leaders contribute to the development and implementation of 
national and geo-political strategy. They astutely manage complexity, and 
anticipate transitions at campaign level. They embody the expertise and 
the wisdom within our Army. These leaders operate within the Joint, 
Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment as a 
matter of routine and lead across those boundaries to advance national 
interests. They coordinate and synchronize combined operations with 
allied and coalition partners, interagency organizations, and a range of 
civilian organizations. They determine and deliver effects across the 
spectrum of conflict.19 
DOC: It sounds to me like the Army’s GPF comprise a professional bureaucracy 
attempting to change its design and culture while simultaneously adhering to the same 
hierarchical professional education system in place since the 1970s. Based on what you 
have provided us, I can’t help but agree with Dr. Arthur T. Coumbe of the Strategic 
Studies Institute, who believes the Army’s professional development system 
“subordinates intellectual and strategic astuteness to tactical and operational expertise.”20  
OPS: Yeah Doc, my major problem is with the GPF leader development strategy 
as well. What these guys describe as the desired endstate for senior leaders is exactly 
what we expect of the people on our detachments and teams. ARSOF captains and staff 
sergeants are the ones who must be able to “coordinate and synchronize combined 
operations with allied and coalition partners, interagency organizations, and a range of 
civilian organizations.”21 Our tactical level leaders are the ones who “determine and 
deliver effects across the spectrum of conflict.”22 On the other hand, I think it is safe to 
assume that we expect our senior leaders to execute many of the tasks that the GPF 
assigns to those they call their entry-level leaders. Our Joint Special Operations Task 
                                                 
19 United States Department of the Army, “A Leader Development Strategy,” 12–13. 
20 Arthur T. Coumbe, Army Officer Development: Historical Context (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 14. 
21 United States Department of the Army, “A Leader Development Strategy,” 13. 
22 Ibid., 13. 
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Force (JSOTF) commanders, Theater Special Operations (TSOC) commanders, along 
with all our field grade commanders and senior level staff officers are people we need to 
“anticipate transitions within tactical operations . . . while they concurrently appreciate 
the complexity of the security environment in which they operate.”23 As force providing 
commanders, ARSOF field grade and senior leaders are the professionals who should 
“have sufficient knowledge of geo-politics, culture, language, and information operations 
to recognize the need to consult experts, which in many cases will be our junior 
professionals—those on our detachments and teams.”24 
ADC: Gentlemen, I would summarize your discussion that ARSOF 
organizational structure should differ from that of GPF in the following manner: given 
their sheer personnel numbers and organizational missions, the GPF may still need a 
more routinized assembly-line approach to PME that takes place in stages and does not 
introduce strategy until the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Sergeant Major. We, on the 
other hand, choose to agree with Ohio State University Professor Emeritus Williamson 
Murray who recently gave the following testimony before a United States House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Professional Military Education: 
Educating officers [and we believe NCOs] in stages has the consequence 
that producing a mind that is able to grasp the strategic level of war 
requires the transition to a broader understanding of conflict from their 
earlier conditioning. Not many manage that transition, which is why real 
strategists are so rare. Improving the analytic capabilities of officers [and 
NCOs] and teaching them how to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity 
should begin before commissioning [and at initial entry for enlisted 
professionals] and be pursued concurrently with training throughout the 
whole professional development process.25 
DOC: As I listened to your summary, I sketched out this graphic to highlight the 
differences between the CSA’s view as outlined in the ALDS and our ARSOF-specific 
assessment of human capital development.  
                                                 
23 United States Department of the Army, “A Leader Development Strategy,” 12. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Williamson Murray, Transcript of testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 
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Figure 2.   Human Capital Development 
INTEL: I like how our argument is shaping up and I think we should include a 
discussion of how lessons learned impact GPF versus how they impact the ARSOF 
community. For our purposes, it might be helpful to frame the discussion with an analogy 
from the world of construction. Concerning organizational design and culture, the GPF 
typically uses “lessons learned” to rebuild its organizations while ARSOF organizations 
generally approach fixing themselves from a remodeling perspective. In many cases, 
rebuilding is useful and appropriate but it is also very costly. Rebuilding requires the 
investment of large amounts of time and human capital, and it has a significant impact on 
operational capacity. The relationship between rebuilding an organization and that 
organization’s ability to impact current operations are zero sums. Simply stated, to the 
degree that GPF focus on rebuilding; they have a diminished ability to project power and 
affect current operations. In contrast to the conventional process of using lessons learned  
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to drive massive restructuring, ARSOF organizations typically adhere to the principle of 
making incremental changes based on a holistic assessment of their organizational “fit” 
within the operational environment. 
ADC: I hear you arguing that GPF seek to change the context based on lessons 
learned while ARSOF organizations seek to influence and then control the context by 
working through the local people responsible for managing the context.  
OPS: Sir, that’s exactly what I am hearing and I wholeheartedly agree. I think the 
handling of the Civilian Irregular Defense Corps (CIDG) program during Vietnam 
provides a good historical example of this. The CIDG plan was “the centerpiece of the 
U.S.-sponsored internal development effort in Vietnam . . . to create support among the 
peasants and cut off that same population as a source of support for the Viet Cong.”26 
Author Thomas K. Adams describes the GPF’s plan to change the context in Vietnam 
with the CIDG program in the following manner: 
The CIDG militia units were the essential element of the program, since 
without military protection, the Viet Cong would simply seize control. 
These self-defense groups were to be established at the village level where 
they would pacify the immediate area, meaning they would keep Viet 
Cong elements out of  the village, patrol the local area and defeat or expel 
any Viet Cong units encountered. The pacified areas surrounding CIDG 
area development camps were to be integrated into the already existing 
national strategic hamlet program.27  
The program, executed exclusively by SF soldiers, sought to influence rather than 
overtly change the prevailing context by establishing “the first grass-roots intelligence 
system to collect detailed, systematic information on the NLF (National Liberation Front) 
and the VC (Viet Cong). The SF teams simultaneously conducted numerous simple civil 
affairs programs.”28 As the CIDG program became increasingly successful, the Army 
bureaucracy showed a:  
                                                 
26 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 83. 
27 Ibid., 84. 
28 Ibid., 85. 
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building sentiment for getting SF and their CIDG soldiers out of the 
village-defense business and into the jungles chasing VC, and DOD [sic] 
actively sought to do just that. Thus began a theme that would be repeated 
over and over again. The SF would repeatedly train village-defense forces, 
only to see them marched off for conventional combat or diverted to other 
purposes.29  
The CIDG program lost most of its effectiveness, and the military leadership 
phased it out completely after its came under GPF control and its focus was shifted, 
thanks to external pressures. Taking into account the fact that the CIDG program’s initial 
success was due to SF’s ability to effectively work with and train Vietnamese forces, it is 
interesting to note that in less than a year, the CIDG program was halted. “The official 
U.S. Army Lessons Learned for 1965 recommended that additional emphasis be placed 
on training in basic infantry techniques and small unit tactics.”30 What I find interesting 
about the story is the fact that the SF units involved with the CIDG program were 
successful because they were able to able to assess the situation without placing 
themselves inside the narrative unfolding in front of them.  
In the second part of his book, Adams makes two points that I think are very 
applicable to our discussion. In addressing the success of the CIDG program before GPF 
took control, he writes that the CIDG was successful because of its adherence to the 
concept that “unconventional-warfare operators must be able to operate outside their own 
cultural milieu.”31 Adams goes on to note that “the Army Special Forces in Vietnam was 
able [sic] to attract such flexible persons, place them in appropriate positions and allow 
them the latitude to create their own jobs in the absence of useful doctrine or national 
policy.”32 In contrast, the GPF sought to change the existing social context in Vietnam by 
placing itself in the middle of the narrative and then attempted to restructure the 
environment to the Army’s liking. Adams describes a point of view that I think still 
applies to today’s GPF:  
                                                 
29 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare, 87. 
30 Ibid., 92. 
31 Ibid., 146. 
32 Ibid. 
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The dominance of the Army paradigm and its resulting puzzle solutions 
(the military-technical approach and the conventional model of 
warfighting) had important impacts on the prosecution of the war. Once 
the 1965 decision was made to introduce large numbers of U.S. troops, it 
was inevitable that the military effort, with its greater resources, would 
become the dominant influence on U.S. policy in Vietnam.33 
I think we should use Adams’ research to show, as an organization and regardless 
of the GPF’s educational curriculum, it will always make itself the central figure in a 
military campaign because it is organized as a professional bureaucracy. This is the 
opposite of ARSOF. 
DOC: Now we need to address the one thing that we haven’t explicitly covered in 
our discussion thus far. What does the history of ARSOF portend for the future? 
ADC: The relevance of our history to our future is that the Army specifically 
created ARSOF units as small flexible teams for two broad purposes. The first reason for 
creating ARSOF organizations as small scalable units was to enable them to train and 
conduct combined operations with foreign indigenous forces operating deep inside enemy 
territory. The second reason for ARSOF’s enduring organizational design is to provide 
the President of the United States with a force capable of conducting America’s special 
operations in such a fashion as to maximize strategic gains while simultaneously 
minimizing resource expenditures, collateral damage, unnecessary exposure, and 
unintended consequences. Many of the organizational and cultural changes discussed by 
the CSA have been part of ARSOF since their creation.  
INTEL: Do the notions that emerging challenges “will require a fundamentally 
different Army from the one we had before 9/11,”34 and that “the challenges of 
institutional change in large organizations like the Army are substantial, especially as we 
are adapting an organization that is already the best in the world at what it does”35 hold 
any meaning for us?  
                                                 
33 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare, 147. 
34 Ibid., 30. 
35 Ibid., 40.  
 22
ADC: I think those views are probably correct when applied to GPF, but I don’t 
think they hold anywhere other than maybe at the margins when applied to ARSOF units. 
Further, Mintzberg’s belief that “sometimes an organization’s management, recognizing 
the need for internal consistency, hives off a part in need of special treatment,”36 but that 
“it is difficult to corner off a small component and pretend that it will not be influenced 
by the rest”37 requires consideration.  
INTEL: Based on everything that I have read, the GPF is attempting to 
revolutionize almost every aspect of its organization while simultaneously trying to 
inculcate many of the functional skills that have been the hallmark of ARSOF 
professionals since the era of Colonels Bank and Volckmann. I believe the GPF Forces 
have correctly realized that their current organization is incongruent with the emerging 
security environment. However, while many observers believe the Army has the wrong 
structure in the right situation, my view is pretty much in line with the CSA who believes 
that “one truism about predicting the future is that we will never get it exactly right; 
indeed, we can only aspire not to be too wrong.”38 That said, the GPF leadership has the 
choice “between evolution and revolution, between perpetual mild adaptation, which 
favors external fit over time, and infrequent major realignment, which favors internal 
consistency over time.”39  
As we discussed earlier, JFCOM’s analysis of the emerging security environment 
between now and 2035 unequivocally finds that “the state will continue to be the most 
powerful international actor.”40 The key point JFCOM makes is that “the power of states 
will vary dramatically from culture to culture, region to region but will mutate and adapt 
to the international environment’s changing conditions as a centralized mechanism 
through which power is organized.”41 Accepting the current GPF organizational structure 
                                                 
36 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 13. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Casey, Army Magazine, 30. 
39 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 14.  
40 United States Joint Forces Command, “The Joint Operating Environment,” 38. 
41 Ibid., author’s emphasis. 
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and JFCOM’s analysis of the future leads me to the counterintuitive conclusion that 
maybe the Army’s GPF should maintain the organizational construct they have had since 
WWII. I am not advocating a rigid adherence to what worked in the past regardless of the 
current or future context. However, as discussed by organizational theorist Henry 
Mintzberg, I believe in the notion of maintaining the status quo at least long enough to 
determine whether the organization should attempt to change the environment or if the 
organization should allow the environment to change it.  
The way to deal with the right structure in the wrong environment may be 
to change the environment, not the structure . . . . An organization cannot 
be all things to all people. It should do what it does well and suffer the 
consequences.42 
OPS: If the GPF does decide to stick with its current plan to undertake a massive 
restructuring, as I think it will, it would do well to listen to the advice of Mark Moyer, 
who writes: 
Recently, some reformers have advocated making the U.S. Army an 
adaptive organization by transforming the organizational culture through 
new policies, incentives, educational programs, and organizational 
structures. The desired final product—an adaptive organization—is the 
correct one, but the instruments proposed for creating it are inadequate; 
they cannot reshape an organization by themselves any more than chisels 
and rasps alone can change the shape of marble.43 
The Army’s GPF appears to be suffering from an identity crisis in that it wants to 
combine the adaptability of an adhocracy’s people with the stability of a bureaucracy’s 
hierarchical structure. Speaking bluntly, a professional “bureaucracy in a dynamic 
industry calling for constant innovation or, alternately, a flexible adhocracy in a stable 
industry calling for minimum cost makes no sense.”44 The more ARSOF and GPF 
converge, it is more likely we will see a force consisting of unconventional warfare 
professionals organized in such a highly conventional structure that they will be unable to 
                                                 
42 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 14. 
43 Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009), 260. 
44 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 13. 
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“interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, 
while shielding them [the population] from insurgent violence, corruption and 
coercion.”45  
ADC: Is it fair, then, to say that the ARSOF community should be different than 
the GPF in both organizational structure and mission set because allowing for an 
ARSOF-GPF convergence would result in a decrease in ARSOF’s ability to conduct the 
missions they were created to conduct? 
INTEL: I know you’ll get no disagreement from the SF guys in the room. Do you 
have any issues with that conclusion Doc? 
DOC: I have no problem with it. The conclusion is predicated on well-
documented history and the widely accepted principles of organizational theory. 
Obviously, there are going to be critics, but those who disagree with us will do so as a 
matter of perspective more than for any other reason.  
ADC: As far as I am concerned, we are now at the point that, drawing on our 
history and an analysis of the evolving strategic operating environment, we need to 
explore the type of ARSOF professionals we think we need in order to execute ARSOF’s 
expected future mission set. Why don’t we start there tomorrow? You guys go ahead and 
do whatever you need to do while I take the last few minutes of the day to send the DCO 
an update showing him what we have accomplished so far.  
 
 To: DCO, USASOC 
 From: Aide-de-Camp 




 IPR #1 slides are attached; slide one is our BLUF while 2-3 provide supporting 
 information. 
 
 V/R  
 ADC 
                                                 
45 Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment (Kabul: Headquarters, International 

























































strategic astuteness to tactical and operational expertise.” —Dr. Arthur T. Coumbe  
 
Figure 5.   Human Capital Development 
B. ARSOF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCIES 
ADC: The boss requires me to complete a book report every couple of months 
and I read a passage last night that did a good job encapsulating the type of ARSOF 
leader that would fill our ranks in a perfect world: 
I suspect that despite the limited understanding we have of events in 
distant places,  there will always be those among us who have the gleam of 
the quest in their eyes. They are people of every sex and station and they 
yearn to be challenged to a cause. They will always be looking for that 
wrong to right, that ill to cure, that song to sing; and there will always be 
those who will go to arms in aid of the helpless and the downtrodden. 
Ignoring the political issues of the moment, these people will champion 




the outcome, in their romantic hearts they will keep the secret, if secret it 
must be, that they are better men for having held the lamp beside the 
golden door.46 
DOC: You are right when you discuss having a leader who can do everything all 
of the time as part of a perfect world. From my perspective as a psychologist, I can tell 
you that it is virtually impossible to always slate the perfect people against the 
appropriate tasks for their skill level.  
OPS: Gentlemen, as the lone NCO on the team, I think we need to remember that 
we are not searching for THE answer to the question, but that we are sifting through the 
multitude of answers that are out there and summarizing them for the DCO. First, we 
need to agree on the types of missions that we foresee requiring ARSOF involvement in 
the next couple of decades. Second, we need to identify the skills and abilities required to 
accomplish these missions. After we do those two things, I believe we can develop a 
basic profile of what we believe these types of professionals should look like.  
ADC: You have laid out a good course of action. Let’s take a look at the SOF 
core activities and see if we are comfortable validating them as necessary for the next 
twenty years. Army Field Manual 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces states that 
ARSOF currently have the following nine core tasks:  
• Direct Action (DA) 
• Special Reconnaissance (SR) 
• Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
• Civil Affairs Operations (CA) 
• Counterterrorism (CT) 
• Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
• Support to Information Operations (IO) 
• Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)47 
                                                 
46 David Donovan (pseud.), Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Ballantine Books, 1985), 300. 
47 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C., 2006), 2–1. 
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I know that everyone in this room is quite familiar with the descriptions of these 
tasks, but if you ever need a concise description of them, I recommend taking a look at 
Admiral Olson’s Joint Forces Quarterly article “U.S. Special Operations: Context and 
Capabilities in Irregular Warfare” published in Issue 56, 1st quarter of 2010.48 
Now that we have these core tasks listed, let’s take a look at the definition of a 
“special operation:” 
Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped 
military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or 
informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, 
denied, or politically sensitive areas. These  operations are conducted 
across the full range of military operations, independently or in 
coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations 
forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special 
operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and 
oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional 
operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, 
mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and 
dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.49 
This definition is very broad and it allows us maximum flexibility given the types 
of missions we might be called on to perform during the next twenty years. Let’s evaluate 
the ARSOF core tasks against this definition and see if we can narrow the scope of 
expected standalone mission sets for our research. Then we will be able to tell when and 
if there are any additional missions that we should add to the list. 
OPS: Sir, I have been a non-commissioned officer in the Special Operations 
community for a long time and, although it is a very unpopular view, I want us to make 
the argument that DA should not be classified as a standalone mission. Army Field 
Manual 3-05 defines DA as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive 
actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments and that employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, 
                                                 
48 Admiral Eric T. Olson is the Commander, United States Special Operations Command. 
49 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2003), GL–11. 
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exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.”50 The manual goes on to say that “DA 
differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, 
operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve 
specific objectives.”51 Our doctrine makes it a point to state that DA missions have a very 
limited scope, are time sensitive, and require a precise application of force. I believe that 
SOCOM has the ability to conduct these missions utilizing elements other than PSYOP, 
CA, and SF forces. I know the DCO’s guidance was to stay away from discussions of the 
75th Ranger Regiment’s mission sets, and I am certainly not arguing that we should lay 
down our arms and refuse to conduct another close-combat operation. However, I do 
think the Ranger Regiment, Navy SEALs, and other SOCOM elements can conduct the 
lion’s share of the work when it comes to “seizing, destroying, capturing, or recovering 
through short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions in denied areas.”52  
I am not arguing that DA is not a special operation, I am merely pointing out the 
fact that there are other Special Operations Forces in the United States military better 
suited to conduct DA, as a standalone mission, than the ARSOF forces we are concerned 
with as part of this project.  
The founders of ARSOF forces, especially SF, created us specifically to conduct 
SR, UW, and FID missions. A look at our history helps make my point and adds some 
academic rigor to my argument. The 10th Special Forces Group is our longest standing 
group and it was the first formal Army peacetime unit ever dedicated to special 
operations. The unit’s wartime mission was to develop, organize, train, equip and direct 
anti-Soviet resistance forces in Eastern Europe in the event of war with the USSR.”53  
Then, “on 24 June 1957, the 1st Special Forces Group was activated at Camp 
Drake, Japan . . . and was immediately transferred to the island of Okinawa, where it 
organized Mobile Training Teams to instruct Asian allies in unconventional warfare 
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tactics.”54 Finally, “members of the 77th SFG were deployed to Laos in 1959 under 
civilian cover to assist French UW forces training the Laotian Army.”55 The missions 
undertaken by these early SF units were textbook special operations even according to 
the current ARSOF definition of UW. FM 3-05 describes UW as: 
A broad range of military and/or paramilitary operations and activities, 
normally of long duration, conducted through, with, or by indigenous or 
other surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 
otherwise directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW 
operations can be conducted across the range of conflict against regular 
and irregular forces. These forces may or may not be State-sponsored.56 
Unconventional Warfare is arguably the most important mission that ARSOF 
forces must prepare for, and this is no less true today than during WWII. Today’s SF and 
PSYOP units trace their history to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which came to 
fruition during World War II. “The OSS’s unconventional warfare mission laid the 
foundation for today’s Special Forces, emphasizing training of foreign indigenous forces 
and regional orientation of American forces (including strong foreign language and 
cultural training).”57 The founding fathers of Special Forces, Aaron Bank and Russell 
Volckmann, chartered the organization with a focus on UW. They believed the SF 
mission was “to infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy-controlled territory and to 
stay, organize, equip, train, control, and direct indigenous personnel in the conduct of 
Special Forces operations.”58  
The point that I am making with this history lesson about UW is twofold. First, 
UW by its very nature is a special operation; we conduct UW to achieve U.S. strategic 
aims in politically sensitive areas. Second, as long as most people in our world organize 
themselves around the Westphalian state model, the United States will have interests in 
those states requiring ARSOF to work with indigenous or surrogate forces to protect 
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those interests. Furthermore, the emergence of non-state actors like Al Qaeda makes it 
even more critical that we retain and expand our capability to conduct UW well into the 
future.  
If the need for behind-the-lines UW was realized during WWII, the requirement 
for forces specifically trained and equipped to conduct FID was born during the Kennedy 
administration and the run up to America’s involvement in Vietnam. While addressing 
the United States Military Academy class of 1962, President Kennedy stated: 
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war 
by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of 
by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by 
eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . It requires 
in those situations where we must counter it . . . a whole new kind of 
strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly 
different kind of military training.59  
“Although few American military leaders believed that the conflict would be 
resolved through the patient training of South Vietnamese forces and improved civil-
military relations in Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces played this role in Vietnam.”60 
From its beginnings in the rice paddies of Vietnam, FID has evolved as an ARSOF 
mission to the point that it is conducted almost constantly across the entire range of 
military operations in a myriad of operating environments. FM 3-05 says the following 
about FID: 
FID is a subset of stability operations. These operations promote and 
protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and 
information dimensions of the operational environment through a 
combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and 
coercive actions in response to crisis. Army forces, including ARSOF 
(particularly SF and PSYOP), accomplish stability goals through security 
cooperation. The military activities that support these operations are 
diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Their purpose is to promote and 
sustain regional and global stability. Stability operations employ Army 
forces, including ARSOF (particularly CA), to assist civil authorities, 
foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises. The primary 
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role of stability operations is to meet the immediate  needs of designated 
groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these 
tasks without military assistance.61 
I like the fact that the FM describes, rather than defines, FID. In this instance, I 
believe the doctrine truly does the actual mission justice. Due to the holistic nature and 
long-term focus of FID, and understanding that the goal of FID is to resource host nation 
(HN) and paramilitary forces “to maintain the HN’s internal stability, to counter 
subversion and violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability,”62 
ARSOF forces are uniquely qualified to conduct FID operations. Population security, 
host nation military assistance, and counterinsurgency (the three components of FID) lead 
me to believe that ARSOF officers cannot afford to be doctrinaire about this mission.  
When conducting FID, as well as all special operations, the officer leader: 
must approach each conflict with a distinctive theory of victory; there 
should be no formulae specifying what ought to work. Rather than 
assigning the operational tasks of SOF to fit a traditional understanding of 
SOF capabilities, it is important that flexible SOF be tailored to novel 
operational tasks.63  
Nowhere is this more true that when conducting FID. 
Special reconnaissance is the third mission that I believe ARSOF must remain 
prepared to accomplish over the course of the next twenty years. Regardless of the nature 
of our enemies, our senior military and political leaders will always require special 
reconnaissance in order to hold diplomatic engagements, conduct deterrence operations, 
and preside over covert or clandestine military operations conducted to protect American 
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conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 
to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing 
military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.”64  
Due to the sensitive nature of the strategic decisions that SR impacts, and the 
associated requirement for secrecy, there is little doubt that SR is a special operation. The 
four most common types of SR are environmental, armed, target and threat, and post-
strike. SR is critical to America’s grand strategists as they work to develop and 
implement the various aspects of our national security strategy. Special reconnaissance is 
also of vital importance when the United States decides to take military action against a 
rogue state or non-state actor. One of the greatest failures of SR that I am aware of is the 
April 1961 debacle on Cuba’s Zapata Peninsula, known as the Bay of Pigs Operation.  
If the appropriate personnel had provided the appropriate type of SR, there is a 
very real possibility that President Kennedy would have never allowed the operation to 
take place. The basic concept was for the United States to land a group of Cuban exiles in 
a sparsely populated swamp to take control of and hold a beachhead until the Cuban 
population engaged in a spontaneous revolt against the Castro regime. The utter failure of 
the operation provides an important lesson regarding SR. In the words of Richard Bissell, 
the CIA officer responsible for planning the operation: 
It was rather lightheartedly assumed by the CIA that the swampy regions 
around the Bay of Pigs, while utterly different geographically from the 
mountains near Trinidad [previous invasion site] could support guerrilla 
operations. With hindsight, this assumption was highly questionable, and, 
in any event, was not carefully researched in the planning of the 
operation.65 
Had U.S. forces conducted the appropriate environmental reconnaissance, the 
CIA would not have “mistakenly thought that the landing site was mostly deserted and 
that the exiles could land unnoticed.66” Nor would they have “missed the reefs at Blue 
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Beach, which caused the landing to fall behind schedule—leaving the hapless invasion 
fleet still offshore when Castro’s aircraft struck.”67 It is impossible to say that, had the SR 
mission been given to ARSOF forces, the Bay of Pigs operation would have been a 
success. However, I can say with relative certainty that had detailed SR been conducted, 
major changes to the invasion plan would have been made that may well have led to a 
successful invasion.  
It is not my intent to paint ARSOF-conducted SR as the panacea for all military 
problems but I do agree with the following excerpt from JP 3-05: 
Even with today’s sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead 
platforms, some information can be obtained only by visual observation or 
other collection methods in the target area. SOF’s highly developed 
capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide 
communications, and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against 
targets inaccessible to other forces or assets.68 
To end this discussion of UW, FID, and SR, my thoughts on the entire matter are 
these: SF exists for three primary purposes--to acquire information about America’s 
enemies, to conduct operations with surrogate forces, and to provide training to foreign 
governments and militaries. Although ARSOF may be called to perform other missions, 
for example, CT as is the case today in Afghanistan, I think ARSOF needs to make it 
clear to itself and others where its strengths and advantages lie and where it represents 
“value added.” I think the United States government will experience the greatest return 
on its investment when Army Special Operations Forces focus on the missions that led to 
their creation. Given the fact that our forces were created to perform UW, FID, and SR, 
we must strive to conduct these missions more than any other does during the next twenty 
years.  
ADC: All right, Ops, I think you have convinced all of us. For the purposes of our 
briefing, DA is out; SR, FID, and UW are in. Now, what are your thoughts about the next 
group of core activities: CA, CT, PO, and IO?  
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DOC: Before I became a doctor, I was a Civil Affairs NCO and I firmly believe 
that CA missions are special operations for a couple of reasons. In line with the definition 
of a special operation, CA personnel are specially organized and trained right here at Fort 
Bragg. The fact that CA missions “influence, or exploit relations between military forces 
and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace 
in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations”69 leads me to believe they have a high 
degree of political sensitivity. Returning to the definition of a special operation, political 
sensitivity is one of the key factors that make a military operation special. There are also 
many cases where CA operations directly support UW and FID.  
In an article published by the Joint Special Operations University Press, Herb 
Daniels, an SF Major, provides an excellent example of the nesting effect between FID 
and CA. Major Daniels participated in the Special Operations Task Force sent to the 
Philippines “to assist the government of the Philippines in its fight against the ASG (Abu 
Sayyaf Group) and JI (Jemaah Islamash) in the Sulu Archipelago.”70 MAJ Daniels’ 
primary area of responsibility was the municipality of Talipao on the island of Jolo. He 
describes his operational environment this way:  
The team of U.S. advisors provided several capabilities to assist the AFP 
Battalion to include increased intelligence support, improved 
communications and tactical and technical training for combat operations. 
Because U.S. forces were strictly prohibited by the Philippine government 
from engaging in direct combat operations, their greatest weapon became 
humanitarian resources designed to improve the livelihood of the people 
on Jolo while at the same time giving the AFP/U.S. military personnel 
access to the local community.71 
Based on the information above, it is easy to see that the success of the Jolo 
mission rested on MAJ Daniels’ ability to influence the civilian population with a 
targeted civil affairs project that would meet a currently unfulfilled legitimate need.  
                                                 
69 United States Department of Defense, JP-3-05, GL–5. 
70 Major Herb Daniels, Keeping COIN Simple: The Outhouse Strategy for Security Development 
(Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, 2009), 2. 
71 Ibid. 
 37
The project had to involve the village leadership in its planning and 
execution, as well as the local AFP commander, who served as the 
Philippine central government’s representative to the locality. The project 
needed to encourage community participation and be resourced by 
materials that could be secured locally. The complexity of the project had 
to be minimal so that all expertise could be obtained from the village or 
from villagers working in tandem with soldiers in the AFP/U.S. units. 
Most important, after the project’s completion, the AFP/U.S. personnel 
needed to maintain continuous access to the village in order to ensure local 
support and to deter insurgent activity over time.72 
The project that MAJ Daniels’ team conducted in the village of Talipo, which 
earned the support of the local population, village leadership, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), was the construction of outhouses. These outdoor latrines came to 
fruition using materials left over from earlier projects, and ultimately an Islamic medical 
NGO underwrote a portion of the construction. The real value of the project manifested 
itself in two distinct ways. First, the villagers received infrastructure that they had been 
lacking for years and the level of hygiene skyrocketed. Second, because U.S. Soldiers 
and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) built the outhouses along 
with laborers from the local villages, bonds of trust emerged between military members 
and the civilian population. Because of these bonds,  
The AFP battalion commander estimated that credible human intelligence 
on insurgent activity in Talipao was submitted to the battalion on a daily 
basis. Only a few months prior, the AFP had no sources in Talipao, but 
initial intelligence estimated that active members of ASG and JI passed 
through the municipality daily. Within the first month of the outhouse 
projects, AFP sources indicated that routine ASG and JI routes of 
movement were restricted to areas outside of the quickly expanding AFP 
influence in Talipao.73 
Whether used to shape an operating environment in an area like Talipao caught in 
the middle of a low intensity, long duration insurgency, or to rebuild infrastructure and 
governmental operating capacity in a war torn country like Iraq, Civil Affairs operations 
are a critical component of the ARSOF inventory.  
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ADC: OK Doc, CA is in; what do you guys think about CT? 
INTEL: Joint Publication 3-05 says that any offensive measures taken to prevent, 
deter, and respond to terrorism count as CT.74 Maybe it’s because I see it from a different 
point of view, but that definition actually tells me nothing. ARSOF are always 
conducting CT when executing UW, FID, or CA operations. Harkening back to the 
outhouse vignette, I can make a strong case that MAJ Daniels’ team proactively 
countered terrorism on the island of Jolo by building those outhouses. My feeling is that 
CT, in the ARSOF community, is an endstate rather than a mission. ARSOF forces work 
toward the endstate of countering terrorism constantly through a myriad of missions, such 
as FID, CA, and PSYOP. It seems that the Center for New American Security agrees with 
my point when Michele Malvesti writes: 
Special Operations Forces can help prevent terrorism, for instance, by 
training and enabling the security forces of a vulnerable partner country, 
as well as by engaging the indigenous civilian population in order to 
identify critical local needs—all efforts that help build environments that 
are inhospitable to terrorists. They can help deter terrorists from acting or 
receiving critical support for their operations by disseminating information 
that challenges their violent ideological underpinnings and creates doubt 
among audiences regarding their causes and tactics.75 
Countering terrorism is a goal that not only motivates the ARSOF community, but 
GPF as well. In fact, the current national security strategy directs the entire United States 
government to focus all efforts on countering terrorism. I do not believe that CT, as a 
mission separate and distinct from other ARSOF missions, is necessary because all the 
other ARSOF core tasks currently listed in FA 3-05 contribute to countering terrorism as 
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Counterterrorism Reference Manual says it best when it acknowledges, “that no single 
department, agency, or organization of the U.S. Government can, by itself, effectively 
locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups and individuals.”76 
OPS: Sir, I agree with you and JP 3-05 on the point that a myriad of missions 
have an impact on countering terror. However, I cannot envision a situation in which the 
National Command Authority would direct ARSOF to conduct a CT mission and our 
generals would respond by saying that since everything we do has an impact on CT that 
they are just going to deploy several teams to conduct SR and FID. Those generals would 
be immediately relieved and SOF would be directed to conduct CT operations. Yes, 
everything we do has an impact on countering terror but not all types of terrorist activity 
are countered by what we do. We market ourselves as an adaptable organization capable 
of conducting non-standard missions and then you make the case that CT shouldn’t be a 
standalone mission. I do not agree with that stance because the undefined nature of what 
constitutes terrorism requires those attempting to counter it to maintain the greatest 
degree of adaptability possible.  
INTEL: You make a salient point; rather than attempting to define CT into 
irrelevance, we should embrace it as a mission to which we are able to dedicate all 
ARSOF skills and abilities regardless of the form in which terror manifests itself. Thanks 
for helping me to see CT from such a new perspective.  
ADC: Ok, it looks like we have reached an agreement on CT. The next topic for 
discussion is PSYOP. 
OPS: Every time I drive along Son Tay Road here on Fort Bragg and I see those 
huge brand new PSYOP battalion headquarters buildings, I wonder what it is that those 
guys do. That thought is not just unique to me either, by the way; the G3 tells me that the 
CG spends a great deal of time wondering about the future of PSYOP as part of the 
ARSOF community.  
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I know there is a great deal of misunderstanding in the community about PSOYP, 
so let’s start with the definition in JP 3-05. Psychological Operations are:  
planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological 
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior 
favorable to the originator’s objectives.77 
Returning to the definition of a special operation, I believe political risk is at the 
center of what makes PSYOP a special operation. Having said that, I think it is of 
paramount importance to separate PSYOP as a type of special operation from the 
incorrect assumption that every mission conducted by members of the PSYOP branch is a 
special operation. For example, an MOS 37F PSYOP specialist broadcasting a surrender 
appeal or handing out leaflets in support of the Third Infantry Division in Baghdad does 
not constitute a special operation. Conversely, the same 37F broadcasting a surrender 
appeal or handing out leaflets in support of a Special Mission Unit conducting a covert 
raid in Iraq’s Diyala province is conducting a special operation. The determining factor that 
makes the second example a special operation is the high degree of political risk associated with 
the covert raid. 
Psychological operations conducted in countries that are not hostile in their 
attitude toward the United States are also special operations. For example, PSYOP 
soldiers task organized into a Military Information Support Team (MIST) supporting host 
nation efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda networks and professionalize military and law 
enforcement personnel in Pakistan are conducting a special operation. In this case, and 
many others like it around the world, the PSYOP forces are working in conjunction with 
other U.S. government agencies in direct coordination with host nation entities on 
sensitive international issues. Because PSYOP missions meet these aspects of the 
definition, we should consider PSYOP a special operation.  
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ADC: Ok, so even though we generally see PSYOP as a special operation, we 
should not forget the delineation between special operations and GPF PSYOP missions. 
When we build our general profile of what we believe ARSOF professionals should look 
like, we should focus on the type of individual required to conduct Special Operations 
PSYOP. If we make the DCO and the boss understand this delineation between PSYOP 
missions, they will have the information they need to argue that the conventional army 
needs its own active component PSYOP capability outside of the 4th PSYOP Group. 
When the Army’s GPF units have their own capability, our ARSOF PSYOP guys will be 
able to focus their efforts on PSYOP missions that are truly special operations.  
PSYOP LTC Timothy D. Huening seems to agree. As he puts it in something he 
wrote recently, “inadequate staffing, resource constraints and a force imbalance coupled 
with a rising demand for PSYOP, either in MIST configurations or tactical support to the 
Brigade Combat Teams, complicates the understanding of PSYOP capabilities and 
limitations.”78  
OPS: So, it looks like our conclusion here is that PSYOP should be included in 
the ARSOF standalone mission set for the next twenty years with the caveat that not all 
PSYOP missions are special operations, and those that are not are better conducted by 
PSYOP personnel assigned to GPF units separate and distinct from USASOC. If that’s 
what we’re saying about PSYOP, then what about another routinely misunderstood 
mission set known as Information Operations? 
ADC: I want to start with the definition of IO from the joint pub and then I want 
to compare it not only against the definition of a special operation but also against the IO 
capabilities resident in the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) before 
we make our final decision. The approved definition says that IO is “actions taken to 
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own 
information and information systems.”79 In Chapter II, the joint pub goes on to say that 
“defensive IO activities are conducted on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of 
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force employment across the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal 
and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and 
approval.”80  
Using the definition of a special operation as a litmus test, this is how I assess the 
mission of Information Operations. I am laying this information out in a chart because 
my argument may appear counterintuitive and I want to make myself clear. Although I 
think that many IO activities qualify as special operations, I think that these missions are 
outside the purview of ARSOF. As I note in the chart, specially organized, trained, and 
equipped IO forces exist, but they exist as part of USSTRATCOM.  
 
Evaluation Criteria Special Operation Remarks 
Specially Organized Forces Yes Organized outside of ARSOF units 
Specially Trained Forces Yes Trained in non-ARSOF /SOCOM programs 
Specially Equipped Forces Yes Top Secret capabilities  
Objectives Achieved by 
Unconventional Means 
No The capabilities are present in many non-
ARSOF units 
Conducted in Politically 
Sensitive Areas 
Yes  
Conducted Across Range of 
Military Operations 
Yes  
Conducted with Low 
Visibility Techniques 
Yes  
Require National Level 
Oversight 
Yes  
Table 1.   Assessment of Information Operations as a Special Operation 
Claiming IO as part of the ARSOF domain creates levels of redundancy and 
confusion that simply are not necessary. Looking at the definition of IO again, actions 
taken to affect adversary information in support of special operations missions have been 
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and should continue to remain under the control of our organic PSYOP personnel at the 
tactical and operational levels of war. If we ever find ourselves in a position that requires 
us to conduct offensive IO, in order to disable or destroy an adversary’s information 
platform, we will have to conduct that through USSTRATCOM regardless of our organic 
capabilities and that is a strategic operation. If the target platform is internet-based, and 
almost all of them are these days, not even a geographical combatant commander has the 
authority to authorize an attack against it. Such an attack requires the review, nomination, 
and approval of a cyber Joint Interagency Task Force. What I am saying, basically, is that 
we will never own the authority for offensive IO. Nor will we own the personnel to 
conduct IO because they reside in either STRATCOM or the GPF. For these reasons, I do 
not think it is prudent for us to say that IO is a standalone ARSOF mission. 
Also, in accordance with the joint pub definition, conducting defensive IO on a 
continual basis will force us to increase resource allocations to IO at the expense of other 
missions in much the same way as we have seen allocations to DA increase at the 
expense of FID and UW missions. My recommendation is that we leave IO to the three 
STRATCOM subordinates specifically trained, resourced, and networked to conduct it: 
the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC), the Joint Task Force-Global 
Network Operations (JTF-GNO), and the Joint Force Component Command-Network 
Warfare (JFCC-NW).  
The JIOWC has over 200 personnel specifically trained to “enable Joint Force 
Commanders to plan and execute IO, both offensive and defensive involving the 
integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), 
military deception (MILDEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network attack 
(CNA)/computer network defense (CND).”81 In addition to the IO capabilities owned by 
the JIOWC, the 136 people who comprise JTF-GNO direct “the operation and defense of 
the Global Information Grid to assure timely and secure Net-Centric capabilities across 
strategic, operational, and tactical boundaries in support of DoD's full spectrum of war 
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fighting, intelligence, and business missions.”82 JFCC-NW is a little known component 
of USSTRATCOM responsible for the passive monitoring of, and offensive action 
against, enemy information platforms that utilize the internet. It is interesting to note that 
the director of JFCC-NW also serves as the director of the National Security Agency 
(NSA), which is one of the best IO agencies in the entire world.  
At this point, I hope it’s clear just how intimately involved USSTRATCOM and 
the NSA are with conducting IO. I would also like to point out that JTF-GNO and JFCC-
NW are merging to create a four-star level, sub-unified U.S. Cyber Command this year. I 
feel that all of this information makes the argument that, IO is a mission set best managed 
and conducted outside the scope of USASOC.  
DOC: The final mission that we need to review is CP, but as we do so we must 
remember that the vast majority of ARSOF’s CP tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) are classified. CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, 
capture, or recover WMD.”83 Both JP 3-05 and Army FM 3-05 are quite vague in their 
discussions of CP, so I dug into Joint Publication 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction looking for a bit more information. This document, along with JP 3-05, 
discusses Special Operations capabilities regarding CP in the vein of interdicting the 
ability of terrorist networks to obtain WMD. The degree of physical and political risk 
encountered by ARSOF personnel conducting CP operations easily marks it as a special 
operation, and the fact that failure to dedicate any assets and skills that we own to the CP 
fight could result in the destruction of our entire country requires that we classify CP as 
an ARSOF mission.  
INTEL: I think we need to have a robust discussion regarding the relevance of 
CP as a special operation. However, doing so requires us to move into a classified venue. 
The next time we attend a classified update, let’s stay behind and talk CP.  
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ADC: Gentlemen, pending the classified discussion, we have completed our 
review of what doctrine calls the nine ARSOF core missions, and we have agreed on the 
ones that we should classify as a standalone mission. Now, let’s take a moment and 
review what we have determined. For the purposes of defining the type of ARSOF 
professionals necessary to conduct special operations for the next couple of decades, we 
are recommending that the following ARSOF missions be maintained without further 
caveat: UW, SR, CA, and FID. We believe that some, but not all, PSYOP activities are 
ARSOF missions. Additionally, we are recommending that DA and IO are eligible for 
deletion as standalone missions for the next twenty years. Does anyone have any problem 
with these recommendations? Does anyone think there are any missions that we should 
add to the list? 
INTEL: I would like to address security force assistance (SFA). I know this 
emerging mission has the attention of the Secretary of Defense and I think it is a mission 
that we should add separate and distinct from FID. The niche for SFA missions is the 
space between the end of stability operations, of which FID is a part, and State 
Department diplomatic operations. A recent report from the Army’s Strategic Studies 
Institute describes SFA operations in the following manner: 
According to the DoD’s draft instruction on relationships and 
responsibilities for SFA, it is defined as: (1) operations, actions, or 
activities that contribute to unified action to  support the development of 
the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting 
institutions; (2) the bolstering of a foreign security force or institution’s 
capabilities or capacity in order to facilitate the achievement of specific 
operational objectives shared with the USG.84 
I understand SFA to be operations that are advisory in nature and conducted at the 
strategic and political levels of government, much like those that Colonel Edward Geary 
Lansdale conducted in the Philippines during the 1950s. The objective in a FID mission 
is for American troops to advise successfully some component of the host nation’s (HN) 
security force. As I understand the Army’s definition of SFA, its focus is on the 
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governmental institutions that support the HN security forces. Advising the HN civilians 
who run the executive level agencies charged with national defense and security is an 
area of paramount importance to the United States government. America’s current 
National Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on the ability of U.S. forces to “facilitate the 
integration of military operations with allies, contribute to regional stability, reduce 
underlying conditions that foment extremism and set the conditions for future success.”85 
I think the NMS provides ample justification for the conduct of SFA outside the 
parameters of FID.  
As I mentioned earlier, Colonel Lansdale is an excellent example of an SFA 
advisor. He was an advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, the Philippine secretary of national 
defense. Utilizing little more than his innate charm and uncanny wile, Lansdale 
developed tremendous personal chemistry with Magsaysay. The personal relationship 
between Lansdale and Magsaysay enabled Lansdale, a military officer, to serve as an 
advisor to a civilian on how to use to his military; Lansdale was not a direct military 
advisor, per se. The real magic to the relationship was the fact that Magsaysay was 
comfortable enough to speak with his guard down and float outside- the- box ideas to 
Lansdale without fear of losing face. Their relationship ultimately resulted in the 
resounding defeat of the Huk communist rebellion in the Philippines, and the election of 
the pro-American Magsaysay as the President of the Philippines.86  
Introducing U.S. military advisors with the ability to effectively advise HN 
civilian leaders, just as Lansdale was able to do, shows there is no better way to “improve 
the capabilities of allies and other partners, as well as the quality of the relationship 
between the United States and such partners.”87 Certainly, the ARSOF community 
contains some professionals with the ability to advise HN civilian leaders. In addition to 
the fact that many of our guys are excellent advisors because of their UW and FID 
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experiences, SFA should be considered an ARSOF mission because HN capacity 
building in conjunction with America’s national security objectives carries a significant 
degree of political sensitivity and a large amount of national level oversight. Unlike 
members of GPF units, ARSOF guys are trained for and routinely conduct missions that 
are politically risky and heavily scrutinized by the international community. I think it 
makes sense to include SFA as an ARSOF mission because our guys are educated, in the 
classroom and on the job, to conduct SFA-like missions.  
ADC: Intel, from the nods I see around the table, you made a compelling case. 
Now, let’s take a look at the skills and abilities that we think ARSOF professionals need 
to effectively prosecute the ARSOF mission set.  
INTEL: While we were reviewing the missions, I wrote down the key aspects of 
each mission we agreed on because I think these aspects will help us identify the type of 
professionals that ARSOF will need to conduct the missions. What I wrote down looks 
like this: 
 
ARSOF Required Capabilities: 
Operate independently Develop, manage, discover, and interdict 
networks 
Explain and promote U.S. national interests Bolster HN capacity 
Assist foreign and domestic civil 
authorities 
Identify and address causes of instability  
Operate in politically sensitive 
environments 
Influence behavior 
Synthesize and leverage the political and informational dimensions of an operational 
environment 




What I take from our discussion thus far is that the ARSOF professional is 
someone who “discerns new insights of the battlespace, develops responsive plans, and 
applies innovative, unexpected operational or organizational solutions to accomplish 
mission objectives.”88 
DOC: Sir, based on your list of capabilities and the recent finding that “SOF 
leaders do not believe that they are sufficiently prepared to operate at national policy, 
strategic, and theater operational levels,”89 wouldn’t we say ARSOF needs to do a better 
job attracting, educating, and retaining leaders who can develop strategic estimates, as 
well as strategic appreciation?  
OPS: Sure, that’s great Doc. But, what does that mean? 
DOC: The USSOCOM Strategy 2010 says that: 
Strategic Appreciation goes beyond mere data, information, and 
knowledge. By applying perception, perspective, culture, history, and 
geography we try to achieve a higher level of understanding—not simply 
what and how events occur but rather why. This appreciation concentrates 
on relationships and synthesis of information rather than data and threats. 
Whereas a strategic estimate is an assessment of conditions against a 
baseline or plan, a strategic appreciation incorporates the understanding of 
the geostrategic context.90 
I know that it’s difficult to delineate between an estimate and an appreciation but I 
think that ARSOF should further clarify that a strategic estimate represents the union of 
three components: becoming aware of information, grasping the meaning of that 
information, and assessing that information against a set of evaluation criteria. Strategic 
appreciation, on the other hand, is achieved via the confluence of understanding, 
synthesis, and leverage. An ARSOF professional with a high degree of strategic 
appreciation has the ability to comprehend the primary impacts, implications, and 
ramifications various stimuli have on individuals, groups, and systems, as well as the 
                                                 
88 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., Joint Special Operations University Educational Requirements Analysis 
for Academic Years 2005–2010 (McLean: Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., 2005), 16. 
89 Ibid., ES7. 
90 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010 
(Tampa: United States Special Operations Command, 2009), A2–A3. 
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ability to predict accurately the secondary and tertiary effects of the stimuli within a 
relevant context. In order for ARSOF professionals to achieve success in the missions we 
have identified, they must be able to develop strategic estimates and strategic 
appreciation. I believe we can deal with the nuances of developing strategic appreciation 
in the coming weeks but, for now, I am relatively sure that we have established a baseline 
profile for the ARSOF professional of the future. 
ADC: Gentlemen, we have arrived at a point where we need to prepare a short 
summary for the DCO to ensure that we keep him apprised of what we’re doing and the 
direction we are headed. Based on our work over the last week or so, let’s give the DOC 
a couple slides as our IPR number two. While he is reviewing our work on this portion of 
the project, we will move on to dealing with the third question: how could we structure 
an ARSOF education system that resources our professionals with the competencies that 
you identify? Go get started on the weekend while I e-mail our update slides to the DCO.  
 
 To: DCO, USASOC 
 From: Aide-de-Camp 




 Please review the working group’s IPR #2 summary slides below; slide one is our 
recommended ARSOF standalone mission set, slide two portrays the competencies we 
think ARSOF professionals should possess in order to successfully accomplish the 


































Figure 7.   ARSOF Competencies 
C. ARSOF EDUCATION FRAMEWORK 
ADC: Given the roles and missions we have discussed, what do you guys think 
about the ARSOF education process?  
DOC: As a psychologist, I have the chance to talk to quite a few PSYOP, CA, 
and SF officers and NCOs; the two words I hear most are flexibility and adaptability. 
Senior leaders tell me they are looking for team and company guys that possess these 
qualities; team and company guys tell me these two qualities have the greatest impact on 




INTEL: I couldn’t agree more; in fact, I was talking to a mentor of mine that now 
works in the Pentagon’s office of Net Assessment, about PME, and he turned me on to a 
study that his office conducted in 2003. I found the summary of the conference report he 
sent me profound in its simplicity. Generally, the result of this particular study pointed 
out that it was crucial to discover a way to have military officers inculcate an 
appreciation for adaptability and flexibility from their first day of commissioned service. 
The study went on to make the following point. 
Officers have to be comfortable with thinking in terms of the art of the 
possible. They must be able to take in multiple points of view and 
different perspectives. Above all, they must be sensitive to context, and 
must be attuned to the fact that positioning is everything.91 
I think this is the correct philosophy to guide ARSOF’s thinking about PME for 
everyone regardless of rank or duty position. One of the major takeaways from the 
conference was that those “who will be our senior leaders in 2030 not only have to have 
strategic vision, but recognize on their own when someone else’s vision is needed.”92 
I agree with the conference folks and I would like to see a PME curriculum that 
educates ARSOF professionals on the topics of strategy and operational art at every rank 
while continually reinforcing tactical training. Waiting until the Army War College to 
address strategic thinking and planning seems too late to me. We hear a lot about tactical 
actions having strategic effects but I don’t think the current PME structure does a very 
good job of helping guys grasp the concepts that comprise strategic theory. I think we 
should explore the possibility of teaching strategy, operational art, and tactics 
concurrently as opposed to the accepted PME structure that begins with tactical training 
and mechanically evolves into strategy-based education for a select few. ARSOF 
strategic education should “distinguish between intellect and character / personality. . . 
Any strategically educable person should have their capacity for sound and perhaps 
superior strategic judgment improved by intense exposure to the small cannon of classic 
                                                 
91 United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Net 
Assessments, The Military Officer in 2030 (Unpublished Summary Presentation, Newport, 2003). Slide 
#43. 
92 Ibid., Slide #86.  
 53
texts on general strategic theory”93 and I think that judgment can be improved at all grade 
levels if the community is willing to support several changes to the ARSOF education 
system.  
OPS: Gentlemen, I understand and appreciate what our senior civilian leaders and 
Washington-based working groups have to say about ARSOF PME; however, we also 
need to consider what our customer units have to say about the performance levels and 
educational shortfalls of our people.  
ADC: I am glad you brought that up; I do a lot of reading and summarizing for 
the CG and I have several excerpts that provide anecdotal summaries of the main 
arguments by branch (CA, PSYOP, and SF) for considering changes to the current PME 
structure. In a 2009 U.S. Army War College Monograph, LTC Miguel Castellanos 
surveyed his War College peers to gain a perspective from former Battalion Commanders 
and staff officers who commanded or worked alongside CA forces in OEF (Operation 
Enduring Freedom) and OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom).94 Castellanos notes the 
following in his analysis: 
Another shortfall noted was the inability for CATs to provide functional 
specialty capabilities, specifically in governance, rule of law, economic 
stability (agriculture) and infrastructure (water and electricity). Conditions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq both exuded vast societal and infrastructure 
challenges, which fostered instability and security concerns. Subject 
Matter Experts adequately capable of responding to problems, develop 
solutions [sic] and commit resources [sic] were few and far between.95  
Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, the former Director of Policy Planning in the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, 
who is now serving as the Interim Director for National Strategic Studies at the National  
 
 
                                                 
93 Colin S. Gray, Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), v–vi.  
94 Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Castellanos, Civil Affairs—Building The Force to Meet Its Future 
Challenges (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 9. 
95 Ibid., 15. 
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Defense University (NDU), characterizes PSYOP shortcomings in much the same way 
Castellanos does those in the CA community. In a 2005 PSYOP-focused NDU 
publication, Dr. Lamb writes:  
A recurrent complaint throughout the operations reviewed by this study 
concerns the quality of psychological operations products. Specifically, 
according to both the JFCOM and 4th POG lessons learned, CENTCOM 
leaders were unhappy with the quality, timeliness, and sophistication of 
PSYOP products.96 
Finally, take a look at the competency model I found in the Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU) Educational Requirements Analysis.97 It contains the best 
information I’ve seen supporting the argument for an amended ARSOF PME model.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Joint SOF Leadership Competency Model 
 
                                                 
96 Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent 
Operational Experience (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2005), 101. 
97 For detailed review of the analysis, please see Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., Joint Special Operations 
University, 16. 
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The JSOU-commissioned study presents the results of a SOCOM-wide survey 
seeking to show how the four service component special operations organizations 
(ARSOF, NAVSPECWAR, AFSOC, and MARSOC) rank their own level of proficiency 
according to the twenty-four competencies that comprise the Joint SOF Competency 
Model. The ARSOF respondents assessed themselves as having mastered the four 
competencies of team building, people development, problem solving, and initiative. 
What I found interesting is the fact that the respondents assessed themselves at much 
lower levels of proficiency when it came to competencies that support the four they 
describe as “mastering.” ARSOF respondents graded themselves as operating at the 
performing level98 with regard to the following six competencies: joint and combined 
warfighting, asset management, strategic art, technology management, resource 
management, and joint C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). Of the six parent categories JSOU uses to 
group the twenty-four competencies in their model, the lowest ratings provided by 
ARSOF respondents correspond to the parent categories of vision and strategy, force 
application, and force management. These self-identified weaknesses become even more 
glaring when you factor in a study conducted five years prior to the JSOU survey. In 
discussing the U.S. Army Special Forces Command Field Survey 2000, administered to 
all active-duty SF soldiers, the authors note “enlisted A-detachment leadership rated 
recent SFQC graduates as least proficient in the attributes of judgment and planning, 
autonomy, adaptability, maturity and language.”99 Although the weaknesses of the four 
studies I’ve just described do not correspond 100%, they speak to the overarching theme 




                                                 
98 The JSOU study defines performing in the following manner: Individual demonstrates general 
ability in this area. Individual can perform some complex tasks with minimal guidance and simple tasks 
independently. Individual is able to contribute knowledge or ideas in this [the assessed competency] area 
(page 20). 
99 Dr. Michelle M. Zazanis et al., “SF Pipeline Review: Voices from the Field,” Special Warfare 
(2000): 6.  
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operators, regardless of duty assignment, are prepared to excel across the myriad of 
defense, diplomacy, and development activities that occur in a whole-of-government 
approach.100  
INTEL: I think the ADC has captured the essence of the argument that ARSOF 
leaders are making—based on our recent operational experiences, ARSOF as an 
organization needs to change the way it educates its officers and NCOs. I think the best 
way to do that is to follow Richard Downie’s aphorism that to learn from an experience, 
an organization must first act to interpret, evaluate, and accept the lessons learned by 
individual organizational members and then make the decision to adapt organizational 
behavior to this new knowledge and transmit it throughout the organization.101 What we 
need to do is come up with what we think is the educational model that will best prepare 
ARSOF Soldiers to fill the roles and execute the missions we have discussed thus far. 
OPS: Yes sir, and if there is any way to do so, I’d like our group to propose a 
framework that will change with the operational environment. I can’t tell you how many 
working groups I have been a part of over the years where all we did was react to some 
event by making a short-term procedural change without planning for a long-term 
organizational or cultural shift. I understand that we will never get it exactly right but I do 
think we should do our best to propose a framework that we won’t have to revamp in two 
years.  
INTEL: Regardless of the model, system, or program we come up with, it must 
speak to individual and organizational flexibility and adaptability just as Doc said a few 
minutes ago. Granted, most of the time we deploy as teams, but the teams are comprised 
of individuals and, at some point, people rotate off teams and end up like us—serving in 
staff positions, or possibly serving as subject matter experts or advisors in places like 
Washington, D.C., Kabul, Baghdad, or Bogotá, just to name a few. Our model must  
 
                                                 
100 United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command Strategic 
Plan (Tampa, 2009), 8. 
101 Richard D. Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the 
Drug War (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 24. 
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capture the quintessence of what LTC Christopher Gehler describes in his War College 
thesis. I think his analysis is pertinent enough for you to indulge me while I quote him at 
length: 
Learning is both an individual and organizational phenomenon. 
Researchers have defined experiential learning as a change of beliefs (or 
the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation of 
experience. This learning happens at the individual cognitive level. 
Organizations, though often thought of as an organism with goals, beliefs, 
and memories, do not and cannot learn in the same way. Organizations 
learn through the experiences of their individual members by encoding 
these experiential lessons learned into organizational norms and routines. 
This is a widely accepted perspective advanced by Argyris and Schon, 
Heclo, and Hedberg. Organizations learn from experiences to the extent 
that member experiences are assimilated into various organizational 
policies, doctrines, and procedures. The research describes a multi-stage 
process in which environmental feedback leads to individual learning, 
which leads to individual action to change organizational procedures, 
which leads to change in organizational behavior, which leads to further 
feedback.102 
DOC: I’d like to see an ARSOF PME model that dovetails with the SF, PSYOP, 
and CA qualification courses. I think the program should contain three phases that 
students move through over the course of their entire career. Following graduation from 
one of the three ARSOF qualification courses, my vision is that students would transition 
out of the first phase following successful completion of a complement of courses 
introducing them to the differences between GPF and ARSOF organizations and cultures. 
Officers, Warrant Officers, and NCOs would transition from the second to the third phase 
upon promotion to Colonel, Chief Warrant Officer Five, or Sergeant Major. However, 
guys that don’t get selected for those promotions would not be penalized and they would 
continue to be educated and employed according to their performance in the second 
phase of the program. 
 
                                                 
102 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Gehler, Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive 
and Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 5.  
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ADC: I think we should base the PME structure on several broad themes that will 
guide the education occurring during all three of the phases that Doc suggests. The 
SOCOM Strategic Plan for implementing the Strategy 2010 discusses three focus areas 
and seven objectives that will drive special operations planning and development for the 
















Figure 9.   USSOCOM Strategic Plan Focus Areas and Objectives 
                                                 
103 For a detailed description of the focus areas and objectives, please see SOCOM Strategic Plan, 
December 18, 2009. 
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I extrapolated eight broad themes from the focus areas and objectives for the plan 
that I presented to the CG. I think the following themes would be excellent topics around 
which to build educational curricula:  
• Organizational Design 
• Strategy and Policy 
• Doctrine, Authorities 
• The Global Synchronization Process 
• Major Force Program-11 (MPF-11) Capabilities 
• Developing and managing Operational Narratives 
• Coordination and Integration. 
Intel: I want us to make sure that the PME model we recommend supports and 
aligns with the skills and knowledge requirements of the jobs graduates will fill 
immediately following their education. Frequently, people are educated to develop 
relationships during utilization tours but they wind up filling positions that do not require 
them to analyze information gathered by others, which necessitates a different skill set 
and knowledge base. Just as logisticians must understand and support the operational 
plan, our PME program must produce graduates who can meet operational needs. To the 
greatest degree possible, the PME system we propose must educate ARSOF professionals 
who fit the strategic context, the requirements of customer units like TSOCs, and the 
needs of the force providing units and deployed teams.  
OPS: Our concept of PME should make it clear that, just because some of us 
aren’t promoted to Colonel, Chief Warrant Officer Five or Sergeant Major or selected for 
service as a commander or command sergeant major, ARSOF education is a career-long 
process. Thinking back to the competency slide that the ADC e-mailed us as part of IPR 
#2, I believe we should recommend a model that allows for two distinct educational 
tracks. As depicted in IPR #2 Slide #2, the two tracks should focus on the development of 
relational and analytical competencies. Doing so will allow for two things. First, if a team 
sergeant determines that one of his guys can’t comprehend what’s going on during a 
deployment, the ARSOF PME structure must give him the assurance that when the team 
returns to home station, the team sergeant can get his guy into classes with a heavy focus 
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on analytical competencies. Second, building two separate tracks will also give our senior 
leaders the flexibility to direct NCOs and officers to a specific track based on their 
demonstrated potential for a command billet or nominative assignment. 
DCO: Pardon me for interrupting guys, but I stuck my head in a few minutes ago 
to see how things were progressing and your discussion caught my attention. The one 
thing I have yet to hear is a discussion of senior leader education. I’d like to give you my 
thoughts regarding executive education, which I assume will take place during the third 
phase of your proposed model. When it comes to executive managers, and that’s what 
ARSOF professionals at my level are, I think one of the most underutilized ways for them 
to remain relevant is through routine education. People at my level are the ones 
determining the themes that your working group believes should undergird the entire 
ARSOF PME system. Any PME model that’s implemented without a well informed plan 
for senior leader discussions regarding the educational themes, processes, and assessment 
variables are necessary to produce the best possible ARSOF officers and NCOs will be 
sub-optimal. Mandating ARSOF-specific executive-level education as a part of your 
PME structure will ensure that senior leaders routinely come together in an academic 
environment to think about the future of our organization and the development of its 
component people according to your framework. I’d appreciate it if you gentlemen 
include my thoughts in your model. I look forward to your next update and I am now out 
the door to my next meeting. 
ADC: I think I have a good idea of what everyone would like to see included in a 
career-long ARSOF education and utilization framework—let’s call it an early day. I 
have duty this weekend and that will give me the perfect opportunity to create a slide that 
pulls everything we talked about today together. Monday morning we can look at the 
slide, discuss a couple different ways we could implement such a framework, and wrap 
up by identifying the possible impacts all of this could have on the way that USASOC 
presently operates.  
D. ARSOF EDUCATION-UTILIZATION MODEL 
ADC: Good morning guys; here is what I mapped out over the weekend. 
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Figure 10.   ARSOF Career-Long Education-Utilization Model 
ADC: I think the processes outlined in this slide convey the ideas that we 
discussed last week. The things I like best about our model are that it supports SOCOM’s 
themes and objective; it allows for the education of individuals who can be task 
organized and utilized in countless combinations; and it predicates itself on the 
understanding that strategic and operational contexts, mission requirements, and 
preferences will change over time. 
INTEL: I like the way we have configured the developmental block to serve as 
an ARSOF basic course. I think it was a wise decision to use the focus areas and 
implementation tasks from the SOCOM Strategic Plan to provide the curricular 
boundaries for our new operators as they transition from their qualification courses to 
their first ARSOF units. 
OPS: Yes sir, I think it’s a great idea to bring our new guys into the classroom for 
an introduction to the intricacies of the special operations community before sending 
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them off to JSOTFs, Embassies, and to work as part of the Interagency process. I think 
the themes listed in the developmental block are both broad and specific enough to frame 
the entire USASOC educational system regardless of phase. However, for this phase to 
work, everyone must attend the basic course. The day we start allowing operators to 
waive this phase in deference to short-term operational needs, we will have undermined 
the developmental process.  
ADC: One of the major selling points of ARSOF developmental education via a 
basic course is that we are introducing our new folks to a unique internal culture right 
about the time they will have completed extensive cultural and language education in 
preparation for service in one of the TSOC areas of responsibility. Although the 
following thought from BG(R) Howard speaks to service in the cultures of foreign 
nations, I think it also applies very well to a new operator’s introduction to the world of 
ARSOF. 
It is impossible to learn the vagaries of every disparate culture a Special 
Forces operator will face in a career. However, it is possible to learn the 
macro fundamentals of culture so that a Special Forces operator knows 
which questions to ask and what pitfalls to avoid before engaging those 
from a particular culture.104  
As I am sure everyone in this room is aware, successfully navigating the SOF 
culture, both inside USASOC and throughout SOCOM, is oftentimes the hardest part of 
the job. 
DOC: I understand the thought behind this phase of our model and I understand 
the themes that we think should drive ARSOF education across all three phases. 
However, I am having a hard time understanding the assessment variables and their 
relationship with the utilization period. Can you help me understand the linkages? 
ADC: Think about it this way, we are serving in a utilization period any time we 
are not in an educational billet, such as Intermediate Level Education at Fort 
Leavenworth, the Training with Industry program, or the Sergeant Majors’ Academy. 
                                                 
104 Brigadier General (ret.) Russell D. Howard, Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a 
Complex Security Environment (Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, 2009), 31. 
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The assessment variables are what the USASOC HQ folks tasked with responding to 
requests for forces and managing assignments should use to ensure that our people are 
educated to accomplish the tasks they will face after they complete whatever phase of the 
educational process they are in. Further, the assessment variables help raters and senior 
raters evaluate officers and NCOs while they are serving in a utilization period. By 
directing them to the educational track that will be the most beneficial to USASOC as an 
organization during that individual’s next utilization period, we ensure the best possible 
fit. For example, an SF officer that shows a penchant for operational analysis while 
assigned as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) liaison officer in Brussels 
should be considered for attendance to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Operations 
Research department, through which he would earn a fully accredited master’s degree in 
his area of interest. Following his graduation, he could be utilized in a highly complex 
Special Operations research and analysis position. Allowing such an education-utilization 
process to take place ensures that the right person is assigned to the right job and the 
wrong person is not.  
To echo Army Regulation 600-100, “as leaders progress through the levels, their 
assignments become more complex and interdependent, and require more responsibility, 
accountability, and authority.”105 For this reason, the USASOC educational development 
model must base itself on outputs. The most pertinent USASOC outputs are SOF 
operators who possess the competencies required by the current context, supported 
organizations, and the network of associated preferences as determined by the assessment 
variables in our model.  
INTEL: Doc, the aide is right. The ARSOF community needs to inculcate a few 
broad assessment variables that will allow our commanders, staffs, and doctrine 
managers to educate and utilize officers and NCOs in a way that will maximize efficiency 
and mission accomplishment. The best thing about the assessment variables is that they 
are useable by evaluators in both the educational and operational realms.  
                                                 
105 United States Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-100 Army Leadership (Washington, 
D.C., 2007), 3. 
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OPS: Gentlemen, I appreciate the need for assessment variables and how to use 
them, but we also need to clarify the thought process behind the assessment variables.  
ADC: The ever-changing requirements of ARSOF customers will drive the ways 
in which the variables are used. For example, when an American Ambassador requests a 
PSYOP team to help his host nation develop an anti-terrorism campaign, his personal 
paradigm, to a large degree, determines who is (and sometimes who is not) deployed to 
support the request. When ODB commanders submit mid-tour AARs, they note 
competency shortfalls that should be used to adjust the ARSOF education system, and 
equally important, which operators and teams are deployed to execute the mission during 
the next team rotation. 
OPS: Now that I understand how customer-based requirements influence the 
utilization period, I think we can also state that ARSOF operators’ performance-based 
reputations are extremely important. Operator reputations have a direct impact on their 
education and utilization during the functional phase. Along with their demonstrated 
potential for future performance, operators’ reputations will have a direct impact on the 
type and frequency of future assignments.  
ADC: You’re right, and since a large portion of our community will spend most 
of their careers in this phase, I think it’s important for us to recommend that educational 
coursework during this phase meet most of the professional development requirements 
outlined in Department of the Army Pamphlets 600-25 and 600-3.106 If the CG approves 
our model, we will obviously need to discuss it with the USASOC doctrine developers 
and personnel managers before it will be ready for the staffing process. When we lay out 
our implementation recommendations, we should discuss the need for future working 
groups to study the impacts of this phase on current officer and NCO education systems. 
For instance, should the curricula derived from our model replace, augment or align with 
ILE, BNCOC, ANCOC, and the warrant officer basic and advanced courses?  
                                                 
106 DA Pam 600-25 is the Army’s NCO Professional Development Guide and DA Pam 600-3 is the 
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management publication. These documents 
provide detailed information regarding the Army’s current educational requirements and career progression 
models for non-commissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers. 
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INTEL: I know answering those questions will require additional working groups 
and meetings, but one thing I am certain of right now is that ARSOF senior leaders will 
have to foment a cultural shift to make sure that individuals who never reach the 
executive-level education phase do not encounter a false perception that they have failed 
to achieve career success.  
DOC: I’d like to offer a thought about our model. As I listened to you summarize 
the developmental and functional blocks, I wondered how we were going to characterize 
the executive-level education block without opening ourselves up to criticism for having 
no experience at the senior executive level. I realize the value of executive-level 
education, outside of preparing individual senior leaders for their utilization assignments, 
is the way that ARSOF senior executives review and refine the themes, assessment 
variables, and competency requirements along with the overarching protocols that govern 
the career-long development process. I feel confident in saying that some flag officers 
may question the model because they won’t think senior leaders should be beholden to 
specific educational wickets; if we make sure to present the executive-level education 
block as the phase that governs the previous two, we may be able to preclude such 
criticism.  
ADC: Speaking of precluding criticism, there are two more issues we need to 
address: why our model doesn’t address language education or tactical training.  
OPS: We can address the lack of tactical training in the model by reinforcing the 
fact that education provides our operators with hard to quantify intellectual modalities, 
while training focuses on the enrichment of easily quantifiable skills, such as 
marksmanship, conducting airborne operations, or physical fitness training. I think we 
address this issue by pointing out that force-providing units will continue to conduct 
training at their level just as they have always done. I believe commanders, sergeants 
major, and first sergeants will be open to our proposals when they hear that we have no 
desire to encroach on their unit training plans.  
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INTEL: When it comes to language education, I think the solution lies in Special 
Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) rather than the ARSOF PME. Rather than 
spending millions of dollars attempting to educate the majority of the ARSOF population 
to speak one of a dozen national languages with an additional dozen regional dialects, I 
think it would be easier to recruit individuals who already possess the language skills that 
our future missions will require. The myriad of intelligence reports I read all agree that 
it’s impossible to predict the future, so rather than having to restructure a language 
education program as contexts change and contingencies emerge, I think language 
education as a current component of the existing SF, CA, and PO qualification courses 
should be maintained.  
DOC: Thinking about your comment that the SORB may hold the solution to 
ARSOF’s language problem, I agree that it’s probably easier to recruit people with the 
language skills we need, and I see a role for our model in that process. As the senior 
sergeants major work through the assessment variable validation process, specifically the 
customer unit requests and the preferences of the deployed teams, I guarantee you that 
shortfalls in language capabilities will emerge. At that point, the sergeants major could 
pass the requirements to the SORB, which could then begin surveying the entire Army in 
an attempt to identify and recruit people who already possess the required capabilities. I 
know this is a provocative idea and I also know that a detailed discussion of language 
education is outside the scope of this working group; however, in the future, we do need 
to address the absence of language education from our model.  
OPS: I agree with you Doc, and I would finish the language argument with a twist 
on an often-quoted SOF truth.107 It is impossible to create language-competent special 
operations forces after emergencies occur. Knowing this, I would agree with Doc’s 
assessment that the best way to deal with the language question is by showing how our 
model supports the identification of language requirements. 
                                                 
107 The SOF truths are: (1) Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies 
occur; (2) Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; (3) quality is better than quantity; and, (4) 
humans are more important than hardware. United States Army Special Operations Command, “SOF 
Truths,” Special Operations Command, http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/truths.html.  
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INTEL: Now that we have addressed the components that make up our model, as 
well as the components that we left out, let’s address possible ways that our model could 
be implemented.  
ADC: The first recommendation that we could make is that USASOC create a 
SOF University to implement and manage our model separate and distinct from the 
traditional leader development of the Army’s GPF.  
INTEL: As we introduce this recommendation, we will have to recognize and 
state that it would be a monumental undertaking, because it would create a schism 
between the GPF and ARSOF. The good news is that there are ways to overcome the 
negative responses to this recommendation.  
ADC: The overarching positive associated with the establishment of an ARSOF 
University is that it provides our senior leaders with the flexibility required to allow the 
strategic context and emerging competency requirements to shape a career-long ARSOF 
educational strategy.  
OPS: The ideal ARSOF University would provide normalizing ARSOF-focused 
education to all qualification course graduates as a group before newly minted operators 
arrive at their units. In the functional phase, I see the university providing branch and 
MOS-specific education through coursework tailored to support current demands and 
emerging trends.  
DOC: I would go so far as to recommend that the university establish 
departments to teach all the aspects of Special Operations, as well as, an additional 
department to provide the education necessary for our guys that need to complete schools 
like ILE and ANCOC.  
ADC: That is a great idea Doc. I think it makes a compelling argument to suggest 
that the ARSOF University should organize itself much like the Defense Analysis (DA) 
department at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS is the SOCOM-funded joint 
educational school that currently provides premier Special Operations PME, as well as 
accredited graduate degrees to officers and warrant officers who complete the DA 
program. 
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INTEL: Now that we have broached the topic of Joint Special Operations PME, 
the second recommendation we could offer would require support from outside the 
ARSOF community. Because the nature of SOF operations is inherently joint, what about 
recommending that USSOCOM’s JSOU implement and manage our education-utilization 
model for the entire Joint Special Operations Force?  
ADC: Sir, your recommendation is one that I support. Just a few weeks ago, I 
participated in a SOCOM working group during which we discussed the nature of SOF 
capabilities required for future operations. When we recommend asking SOCOM to 
manage the entire process through JSOU, I want us to make sure that we bring up the 
idea of JSOU transforming itself into a university organized into two mutually supporting 
subsidiaries. First, JSOU must contain an element dedicated to education along the lines 
we proposed in our previous recommendation. Second, they should have a “think tank” 
branch responsible for developing Special Operations theory and pushing it out to the 
entire SOCOM community, as well as the JSOU’s education branch.108  
DOC: Although the consolidation of resources is good, this recommendation will 
only be palatable if it allows each Service component to retain the management of several 
Service-specific courses that will be mandatory for its operators. Doing this will keep 
Special Operators apprised of developments in their Service specific components, thus 
arming them for success in their parent Service, as well as the Joint SOF environment.  
OPS: It sounds like implementing this recommendation would result in the 
creation of a Special Operations knowledge center that would create SOF doctrine and 
teach it all under the auspices of a single four-star headquarters. This idea is appealing 
because it will synergize SOF efforts into a single command, yet it will allow each 
Service component to maintain a degree of autonomy through the mandatory course 
requirements that Doc just mentioned. I like it!  
                                                 
108 Although not codified in a comprehensive fashion, the ideas contained in this paragraph are a 
conglomeration of recommendations made during the USSCOM 2010 Global Scout Limited Objective 
Experiment #1 conducted 27–29 April 2010 at USSOCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. The author of 
this work had the opportunity to participate in the experiment and he credits retired Colonels Joseph 
Celeski and Grey Welborn for their impact on the ideas presented in this thesis. 
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ADC: Gentlemen, I think we have just completed all of our tasks. Let me send a 
final update to the DCO about our recommendations and then we will be finished with 
this working group!  
 
 To: DCO, USASOC 
 From: Aide-de-Camp 
 Subject: PME Working Group #3  
 
 Sir, 
 Please review the working group’s recommended career-long education-












































































Figure 13.   Education-Utilization Model, Implementation Course of Action #2 
 72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, Thomas K. U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of 
Unconventional Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. 
Baginski, Theresa, et al. A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force 
Assistance Efforts. Government Report, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2009. 
Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Joint Special Operations University Educational 
Requirements Analysis For Academic Years 2005–2010. Government Report, 
McLean: Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 2005. 
Casey Jr., George W. “The Army of the 21st Century.” Army Magazine (2009): 25–40. 
Castellanos, Miguel A. Civil Affairs-Building the Force to Meet its Future Challenges. 
Government Report, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009. 
Couch, Dick. Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior. New York: 
Crown Publishing Group, 2007. 
Coumbe, Arthur T. Army Officer Development: Historical Context. Government Report, 
Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010. 
Daniels, Herb. “Keeping COIN Simple: The Outhouse Strategy for Security 
Development.” Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, January 2009. 
Donovan, David (pseud.). Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, Ballantine Books, 1985. 
Downie, Richard Duncan. Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and the Drug War. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998. 
Dubik, James M. “Preparing for Your Future and That of the U.S. Army.” Army 
Magazine, January 2010. 
Gehler, Christopher P. Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and 
Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow. Government Report, Carlisle: U.S. 
Army War College, 2005. 
GlobalSecurity.org. Early Cold War—Army Special Operations. May 23, 2005. 
http://globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arsoc-history3.htm (accessed May 
11, 2010). 
Gray, Colin S. “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations 
Succeed?” Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly (Spring 1999): 2–24. 
 74
_____. Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict. Government 
Report, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009. 
Howard, Russell D. Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security 
Environment. Government Report, Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, 2009. 
Huening, Timothy D. “Advancing the Art and Science of Psychological Operations 
Requires a Serious Investment.” smallwarsjournal.com (2009). 
http://smallwarsjournal.com (accessed January 16, 2010). 
Joint Special Operations University. Special Operations Forces Interagency 
Counterterrorism Reference Manual. Government Report, Hurlburt Field: The 
JSOU Press, 2009. 
Kaplan, Robert D. “Supremacy by Stealth.” The Atlantic Monthly (2003). 
Krepinevich Jr., Andrew. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986. 
Lamb, Christopher J. Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent 
Operational Experience. Government Report, Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2005. 
Lansdale, Edward Geary. In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 1991. 
Malvesti, Michele. Time for Action: Redefining SOF Missions and Activities. Working 
Paper, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2009. 
Marquis, Susan L. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997. 
McChrystal, Stanley A. Commander's Initial Assessment. Government Report, Kabul: 
Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 2009. 
Mintzberg, Henry. “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review 
(1981): 1–16. 
Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 
Murray, Williamson. Interview by U.S. House Armed Services Committee Subcommitte 
on Professional Military Education. Testimony (September 10, 2009). 
Olson, Eric T. “U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare.” 
Joint Forces Quarterly (2010): 64–70. 
 75
Paddock Jr., Alfred H. U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2002. 
United States Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special 
Operations. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003. 
United States Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Government Report, 
Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004. 
United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Net 
Assessments. “The Military Officer in 2030.” Unpublished Summary 
Presentation, Newport, 2003. 
United States Department of the Army. “A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st 




(accessed January 16, 2010). 
_____. Army Regulation 600-100 Army Leadership. Washington, D.C., 2007. 
_____. Field Manual 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2006. 
United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Operating Environment 2010. 
Government Report, Suffolk: United States Joint Forces Command, 2009. 
_____. U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010. Government Report, Tampa: 
United States Special Operations Command, 2009. 
_____. United States Special Operations Command Strategic Plan. Government Report, 
Tampa: United States Special Operations Command, 2009. 
_____. “Fact Sheets: Joint Information Operations Warfare Center.” U.S. Strategic 
Command-Fact Sheets. November 2007. 
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/jiowc/Joint_Information_Operations_Warfare
_Command/ (accessed May 11, 2010). 
_____.“Fact Sheets: Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations.” U.S. Strategic 
Command-Fact Sheets. January 2009. 
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/gno/Joint_Task_Force_-
_Global_Network_Operations/ (accessed May 11, 2010). 
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. 
Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 76
Wardynski, Casey, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso. Towards a U.S. Army 
Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused 
Upon Talent. Government Report, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 2009. 
Zazanis, Dr. Michelle, Dr. Robert N. Kilcullen, Dr. Michael G. Sanders, and Doe Ann 
Litton. “The SF Pipeline Review: Voices From the Field.” Special Warfare 
(2000): 6–16. 
 77
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Joint Special Operations University 
Hurlburt Field, Florida 
 
4. HQ USASOC 
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina 
 
5. HQ 4th PSYOP Group 
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina 
 
6. Naval Postgraduate School 
Jennifer Duncan 
Monterey, California 
